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NOTE
Independent Expenditures: Can Survey
Research Establish a Link to
Declining Citizen Confidence in
Government?
By Dawn Tae Thorsness*

Introduction
In the eight years since the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed campaign finance reform in Buckley v. Valeo 1, Ameri-

can politics has changed dramatically. One major change, and subject
of heated controversy, is the astonishing increase in uncoordinated

political activity.2 In Buckley, the Court termed monies spent in pursuit of uncoordinated activities "independent expenditures," and held

congressional attempts to put a dollar limit on independent expenditures unconstitutional under the First Amendment rights of free associ-

ation and political expression
Opponents of unlimited spending decry the enormous amounts of

money independent expenditures have injected into political cam* B.A., 1977, Duke University; member, third year class.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. Uncoordinated political activity is money spent outside of the control of the political candidate or ballot measure. According to the Court, "such independent expenditures
may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent. . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate." Id at 47. As statutorily defined, "independent expenditure" is "an expenditure by a
person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is
made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee
or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate." 2
U.S.C. § 431(17) (West Supp. 1983). The term "clearly identified" means the name of the
candidate involved appears; a photograph or drawing of the candidate appears; or the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (18) (West Supp.
1983).
3. 424 U.S. at 58-59 (1976).
[763]
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paigns and point out that expenditures will continue to increase.4 Proponents of continued unlimited independent expenditures state that
independent activity does not pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to dangers of large campaign contributions.' The
United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to qualify Buckley, and has maintained constitutional protection for independent expenditures by holding that expenditure limits violate the First
Amendment. 6 Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated, however, that the door may not be tightly closed to opponents of unlimited
expenditures in ballot measure processes. Both the Court and individual Justices have begun to speak of an "evidentiary" record by which
large sums of money contributed to or expended in ballot measure
processes may come to be regulated.' If such an evidentiary burden is
met, the Court ultimately may be persuaded to uphold regulation of
independent expenditures, just as it has already approved limitations
on campaign contributions.8
This note will examine the origins of and prospects for this new
evidentiary burden in light of recent legislative and judicial responses
to corruption in government. The Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 (FECA)9 and its 1974 and 1976 Amendments'0 will be discussed
with an emphasis on the provisions that apply to campaign contributions and expenditures. The impact of Buckley on FECA and the congressional response will be examined. It will be shown that the case
4. See, e.g., Wertheimer, FixingElection Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3. 1981, at A19, col. 5.
5. The governmental interest of preventing real or apparent corruption was used to
uphold the contribution limits in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, but was rejected as being insufficient to justify expenditure limits, id at 45. See also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City
of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453
U.S. 182 (1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
6. See supra cases cited in note 5. The most recent example is the Court's decision in
Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 116136.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 54-115. For convenience and clarity this Note
will refer to the evidence needed to establish a decline in citizen confidence as an "evidentiary burden" although the United States Supreme Court does not use the term.
8. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 23-38. Title 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)
limits the amount an individual may contribute to a candidate or his or her authorized
political committees and § 441a (a)(3) limits to $25,000 the aggregate annual amount an
individual may contribute; § 441a(a)(2)(A) limits to $5,000 the contributions by a multicandidate political committee to a candidate or his or her authorized political committee.
Multicandidate committees are not limited in the aggregate amount they may contribute. 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
9. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
10. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (current version at 2
U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). See infra text accompanying note 53.
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law since Buckley affecting independent expenditures reveals an apparent willingness by the Supreme,Court to consider empirical data attempting to establish a link between large expenditures and declining
voter confidence in ballot measures. The Court's willingness to consider such a record suggests a similar route by which future independent expenditures may be regulated in a candidate campaign.
I.

Legislative and Judicial Response to Corruption in

Government
A.

Federal Election Law Before Buckley

While Watergate may have focused recent public attention on corruption in government, the legislature and judiciary have recognized

similar concerns for over a century.I' The 1970's witnessed several major congressional attempts to impose political reform upon federal elec-

tion finance, in what has been described by one writer as "a flurry of
legislation to eliminate what Congress perceived as potential abuses in
the electoral process."' 12 Title I of the Federal Election Campaign Act
11. Fourteen years before the United States Supreme Court cautioned against "the free
use of money in elections," Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884), Congress enacted "the first comprehensive Federal statute dealing with corruption in elections," the 1870
Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). The Enforcement Act focused on outlawing
"every type of fraudulent and corrupt practice in connection with elections." Id The
Supreme Court held these laws invalid as applied to municipal elections, United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), but constitutional as applied to congressional elections. Ex Parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
Congress ushered in a new period of election law reform when it passed the Tillman
Act in 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), which prohibited national banks and
corporations from contributing money to federal office candidates. "From that time on,
campaign finances stood in the forefront of Federal election legislation." S. REP. No. 916,
92 Cong., 2d Sess. 1841 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Disclosure of contributions and expenditures, the core of today's federal election law, was a major part of a 1910
congressional statute that required interstate political committees to report contributions
over $100 and expenditures of $10 or more. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, §§ 5, 6, 36 Stat.
823, 824. "All other persons making direct expenditures" of over $50 also had to report. Id
In 1925, Congress passed the Corrupt Practices Act, which, prior to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 and subsequent amendments, "constitute[d] the major part of the
material of the existing Federal law dealing with campaign finances." Id; Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1980)). In 1939 Congress enacted the Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat.
1147 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5), which was designed "to prevent pernicious political
activities" and which primarily prohibited federal employees from active political involvement. SENATE REPORT, supra at 1841. Amendments passed in 1980 extended the prohibition to state and local employees who received federal funds, limited individual
contributions to a political committee, to any candidate or to any campaign for federal office, to $5,000, and limited interstate political committees' annual contributions or expenditures to $3 million. Id
12. S.ROTHENBERG, CAMPAIGN REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: PACs, IDEOLOGY,
AND THE FEC 3 (1981).
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of 197113 had a twofold purpose: to give federal office candidates
greater media access, and to "halt the spiraling cost of campaigning for
public office."' 4 The FECA required disclosure of contributions, limited the amount of his or her own money a candidate could spend on a
campaign and limited media advertising expenditures.' 5 Unlike the
1974 and 1976 Amendments which were intended to check16 corruption,
the 1971 Act was designed to curb rising campaign costs.
A companion piece of legislation passed the same year was the
Presidential Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act). 17 The Fund Act, which
applies specifically to Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates
who accept public funding in the general election, became effective in
1972, and limited independent expenditures made to advance any federally financed Presidential candidates to $1,000.18
Three years later Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974.19 These Amendments were criticized for not
including public financing of congressional elections, 20 nevertheless,
the leader of campaign finance reform described the bil as "historic
campaign reform legislation."'" The Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections said the bill would help end the
"misuse and corruption of power and a misguided dependence on the
13. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3. S.382 had three titles. "Title I
consists of Amendments to Communications Act of 1934; Limitations on Campaign Expenditures for Non-Broadcast Communications Media: Title II, of Criminal Code Amendments, Disclosure of Federal Campaign Funds; and Title III. Tax Incentives for
Contributions to Candidates for Federal Office." SENATE REPORT, 1upra note 11, at 1773.
14. SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 1774. In 1971, Congress was at a disadvantage
regarding the proper limits to accompany reform measures since expenditures at that time
were not required to be reported: "In all candor, it is extremely difficult to establish any
limitation without having complete and accurate facts concerning existing campaign practices and expenditures. Under the present law, candidates are not required to disclose their
exact expenditures. Consequently, Congress has nothing upon which to base a realistic limitation. Nevertheless, we are convinced that some limitation is necessary to curb campaign
costs." Id at 1856, supplemental views of Provty, Cooper and Scott (1972).
15. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(West 1972 & Supp. 1980).
16. This is clear from the stated purpose of the legislation, and from the "Background
and General Discussion" of the Act: "The crisis level has been reached in American Campaign spending.. . . The costs of running for public office have doubled in the last decade. . . . How are financial demands of this magnitude met?" Id at 1774-77. When the
Court in Buckley speaks of the stated purpose of the Act as being to halt corruption, presumably the 1974 Amendments to the Act are being described.
17. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 116-136.
19. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
20. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1974 at 611, 612 (1975).
21. Id at 612.
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influence of large political contributors.

'22
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Among its major provi-

sions, the bill limited political contributions to federal office candidates, 2 3 limited to $1,000 expenditures by individuals or groups
"relative to a clearly identified candidate,"2 4 specified detailed reporting and record keeping requirements of contributions and expenditures
for candidates and political committees,2" created the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the FECA,2 6 and instituted public financing for presidential elections.27 Within two years the
United States Supreme Court held that certain expenditure limitations
under the Act violated the First Amendment.2 8
B. Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court opened its lengthy per curiam opinion in
Buckley2 9 with the "general principle" that "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution."3 The Court recognized that the First Amendment protects the
freedoms of political expression3" and political association.32 Acknowledging that political debate is integral to our system of government, the
Court was equally firm in its statement that such debate may be limited: "Yet, it is clear that '[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute.' ,,3" Under certain circumstances"[e]ven . . . significant interference with protected rights of
political association may be sustained. .. "I'
The Court recognized one such circumstance in the primary purpose of the Federal Election Campaign Act: "to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions."3 5 The Court in Buckley was nearly as concerned with the
appearance of corruption as it was with corruption itself, recognizing
that "the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
22. Id at 616.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(b)(3) (1974) (repealed 1976).

24. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)(repealed 1976).
25. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982).
26. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-439(c)(1982).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 403-08, 88 Stat. 1291 (1974).
28. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. See infra text accompanying notes 29-53.
29. The Court's opinion, together with separate concurrences and dissents by every Justice except Brennan, Stewart and Powell, was 294 pages.
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
31. Id
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id at 25 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
34. 424 U.S. at 25.
35. Id at 26. The Court was apparently addressing the 1974 Amendments; the 1971
FECA addressed rising campaign costs.
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awareness of the opportunities for abuse [is] inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions. 36
After accepting the governmental interest in preventing the reality
or appearance of quidpro quo corruption resulting from large contributions, the Court considered the Act's limits on political contributions
and expenditures. The Court stated that both contribution and expenditure limits implicated First Amendment interests,37 but sustained the
constitutionality of contribution limits on the basis of the legislative
intent behind the Act.3" Using the post-1972 election abuses as an example, the Court stated, "To the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential office-holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined."3 9
In the Court's view, the amount one may contribute to a candidate
or to the candidate's authorized committee does not directly restrain
the contributor's political communication because "the transformation
of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other
than the contributor."40 The act of contributing permits the "symbolic
expression of support" but does not infringe upon the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues. 4 1 The Court concluded that
contribution limits "do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign
42
issues ....
The Court found the governmental interest in preventing the reality and appearance of corruption inadequate, however, when it came to
restricting independent expenditures. 43 The Court reasoned that large
36. Id at 27.
37. Id at 23.
38. Id at 26.
39. Id. at 26-27.
40. Id at 21. Chief Justice Burger criticized the Court's attempt to distinguish the communication inherent in political contributions from the speech aspects of political expenditures. According to the Chief Justice, the Court merely engaged in "'word games" instead of
recognizing that candidates and contributors spend money on political activity to communicate ideas; their constitutional interest in doing so is the same even though someone else may
utter the words. Id at 244.
41. Id at 21.
42. Id at 29.
43. Id at 45, 51. TheBuckley opinion summarized § 608(e)(1) as providing that "[n]o
person may make any expenditure. . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during a
calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the
year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000." 424 U.S. at 193.
The Buckley Court noted that the phrase "relative to" a candidate was not defined in the
Act, and stated that unconstitutional vagueness could be avoided only by reading § 608(e)(1)
as indicating communications advocating the election or defeat of a candidate. 424 U.S. at
45. Nevertheless, the Court determined that even a narrowly construed § 608(e)(1) impermissibly burdened free expression. Id
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expenditures made independently of the candidate and his or her campaign posed little danger of corruption:
the absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or [the candidate's] agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quidpro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.'
The majority also concluded that limits on independent expenditures
could not be sustained on the basis of the governmental interest in
equalizing the voices of individuals and groups seeking to influence the
outcome of elections. 5 The Court then somewhat broadly proclaimed:
"Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of
legislation."46 The future constitutional protection of independent expenditures appeared secure.4 7
In the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act,
Congress reworked those portions of the 1974 Amendments found unconstitutional in Buckley.4 To reflect the Court's interpretation,4 9
Congress also defined "independent expenditure" as one "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . .
44. 424 U.S. at 47.
45. Id at 48-49; see infra text accompanying note 93.
46. Id at 48.
47. Six of the eight Justices (Justice Stevens did not participate) did not object to contribution limits. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented. The Chief Justice
stated that limiting contributions would as a practical matter limit expenditures and the
amount of political activity and debate permitted by the Government. Id at 19. Justice
Blackmun was unpersuaded that "'a principled constitutional distinction"' could be made
between contribution and expenditure limits. Id at 290 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Seven of the eight Justices agreed not to limit expenditures. Justice White joined in the
Court's opinion upholding contribution limits but stated that expenditure limits should also
be upheld as not violating the First Amendment. Id at 259. "[The case depends on
whether the nonspeech interests of the Federal Government in regulating the use of money
in political campaigns are sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that the limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of candidates and their supporters." Id at
260. White would defer to congressional judgment the issue of whether limiting independent expenditures is essential to prevent transparent and widespread evasion of the contribution limits. Id at 258.
Justice White was adamant that "steps must be taken to counter the corrosive effects of
money in federal election campaigns." Id at 260. He predicted, "Without limits on total
expenditures, campaign costs will inevitably and endlessly escalate." Id at 264.
48. The Supreme Court in Buckley also held the Act's fixed ceilings on overall candidate campaign expenditures unconstitutional as burdening First Amendment free expression, id at 55, held the Act's limits on the amount of personal expenditures by a candidate
unconsitutional, id at 54, and held the method of appointment of members of the FEC
unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of separation of powers, id at 143.
49. Id at 42, 44.
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made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate or any
authorized committee or agent of such candidate .
"...5o Other than
certain reporting requirements, 5 independent expenditures were not
regulated, except those made by or on behalf of presidential and vice
presidential candidates accepting public finance for the general election. 2 The 1976 Amendments3 were the last major congressional
change in federal election law.

II. The Evidentiary Record in Ballot Measure Processes
A. FirstNationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti
Independent expenditures received strong constitutional protection from the Court's reasoning in Buckley, apparently closing the door
to their regulation. In a series of campaign reform cases after Buckley,
however, the Court stated its willingness to consider empirical data

purporting to link independent expenditures made in a ballot measure
campaign to a threat to citizen confidence in government.
Two years after the Buckley decision, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed a Massachusetts statute that forbade specified corpora-

tions from making expenditures directed toward influencing the vote
on referendum measures, unless the measure materially affected the

property, business or assets of the corporation.
Bellotti,5 a

4

In FirstNationalBank

of Boston v.
the Court held that the statute abridged the corporation's freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth
50. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1976).
51. 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b)(6), (c) (1976).
52. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1976).
53. The 1979 Amendments were of minor significance. They were enacted to make
reporting and compliance requirements easier for candidates. The effect on independent
expenditures was minimal, and affected procedure rather than substance: political committees that made independent expenditures over $200 had to itemize, while individuals had to
report independent expenditures in excess of $250. 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. at 31-33
(Jan. 5, 1980).
Campaign finance reform since the 1979 FECA Amendments generally has been directed toward limiting what is seen by some critics as a dangerous increase in political action
committee (PAC) activity, rather than focusing specifically on independent expenditure provisions. For example, the 1980 Obey-Railsback bill proposed to limit PAC contributions to
House races; the bill was passed in the House but was defeated by Senate opponents who
argued it would set a precedent that would lead to ceilings on PAC spending in Senate
elections. H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., added to S.832, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash) has drafted bills to restrict independent expenditures and
the use of personal money in campaigns. 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. at 170 (Jan. 22, 1983).
One proposal introduced in the House in the 97th Congress sought to amend the Constitution to allow legislation against independent expenditures. Id.
54. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
55. Id
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Amendments.
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In a suggestive comment, the Court noted the burden

which must be met to prohibit speech: "'the State may prevail only
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.'"5 The
Court in Bellotti set out three such interests drawn from its Buckley
opinion and added a fourth: "[1] Preserving the integrity of the electo-

ral process, [2] preventing corruption, and [3] 'sustain[ing] the active,
alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise
conduct of government,'5 8 [4] Preservation of the individual citizen's
confidence in government is equally important."5' 9
The Court considered the argument in Bellotti that political partic-

ipation by wealthy and powerful corporations in discussion of a referendum issue endangered these four interests by exerting an undue
influence on the outcome of a referendum, thereby "destroy[ing] the
confidence of the people in the democratic process and the integrity of
government. ' 60 The Court's response may be interpreted as suggesting

a route to regulation of independent expenditures:
If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative
findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit
our consideration . . .But there has been no showing that the
relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts, or that there
has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in
government.6
56. Id at 776-83. The majority declared, "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation... or individual." Id at 777.
The four dissenting Justices (White, Brennan, Marshall and Rehnquist) stressed the
special advantages enjoyed by corporations as permitted by the state, and concluded that
corporate speech could be limited through the charter the state granted corporations. Id.
802-28.
57. Id at 786 (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
58. Id 435 U.S. at 788-89 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11).
59. 435 U.S. at 789 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27).
60. 435 U.S. at 789.
61. Id at 789-90 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
The Court's indicated willingness to consider a state interest in preserving the confidence of its citizenry in a ballot measure vote is particularly interesting in light of the Bellotti
Court's strong disbelief that the risk of corruption is present in a ballot measure vote: "The
risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections. . . simply is not present
in a popular vote on a public issue." Id at 790 (footnote omitted). In a footnote the Court
contrasted the problem of the elected representative corrupted by political debts with the
case before it which "present[ed] no comparable problem," id at 788 n.26, and suggested
that Congress might be able to demonstrate a real or apparent danger of corruption "in
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections." Id (emphasis
added).
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If there had been empirical data before the Court in Bellotti which
showed that certain (corporate) expenditures threatened democratic
processes, at least one of the five Justices in the majority might have
been persuaded to join in the dissent.62
B.

CaliforniaMedicalAssociation v. FederalElection Commission
Three years after Bellotti, the Court was presented with an oppor-

tunity to define the type of speech entitled to full First Amendment
protection under Buckley. Although the likelihood of future regulation
of independent expenditures may not have been affected materially by
the decision in CaliforniaAedical Association (CALA) v. FederalElection Commission ,63 the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun forecast the position 64
of the Court in a ballot measure case it was to decide
six months later.
In CALA the Supreme Court upheld against First Amendment
challenges a FECA provision that limited contributions from individu-

als and unincorporated associations to multicandidate political com-

mittees.6 I The Court in CMA reaffirmed the analysis used in Buckley:
the contribution limitation did not violate the First Amendment since it
did not limit what the unincorporated medical association (CMA) or

any of its members could spend independently to advance their polit-

ical views. 6
The Court also considered the argument that the contribution
limit on the California Medical Political Action Committee (CALPAC)
was "akin to an unconstitutional expenditure limitation."6 7 The appel62. See supra note 56. The "swing vote" could have been Justice Blackmun. Three
years after Bellotti in a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined, Justice Blackmun reviewed the State interests explicitly recognized in Belloti and stated: "We did not
find those interests threatened in Bellotti, however, in part because the State failed to show
"'by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes'" or" 'the confidence of the citizenry in government.'" Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 303, (quoting Belloii, 435 U.S. at
789-90) (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 83-116.
63. California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n (CMA), 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
64. The reference is to Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1982); see infra text accompanying notes 82-115.
65. CMfA, 453 U.S. at 200-01. The case involved a factual dispute over contribution
restrictions to a multicandidate committee; it is included in part II of this Note to focus on
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion discussing the effect of issue (i.e., non-candidate)
committees that make independent expenditures. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
Four members of the Court (Justices Stevens, Burger, Powell and Rehnquist) dissented
on the procedural ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction since a 2 U.S.C. § 437(g) enforcement proceeding had been commenced. The dissenting Justices concluded that such a
proceeding precluded the issues from being raised again in an action for declaratory relief
under 2 U.S.C. § 437(h). 453 U.S. at 204-09.
66. 453 U.S. at 201-02.
67. Id at 195.
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lants insisted that contributions to CALPAC should receive the same
constitutional protection as independent expenditures since this was
"the manner in which [they] ha[d] chosen to engage in political
speech."68 The Court admitted that these arguments had "some surface appeal" but found them "in the end unpersuasive." 6 9 Speech
through CALPAC' 7 1was not direct speech, 70 stated the Court, but
"speech by proxy
in which CALPAC, a separate legal entity that
received funds from multiple sources, engaged in its own political advocacy. 72 "Speech by proxy"-indirect speech under the Buckley analysis-was not the type of speech the Court found entitled to full First

Amendment protection.
The appellants' alternative contention was that the challenged provision was "qualitatively different" from the Buckley contribution lim-

its. The petitioners argued that since their contributions flowed to a
political committee instead of to a candidate, the danger of real or ap-

parent corruption of the political process was absent; consequently,
there was no governmental interest to justify the contribution restric-

tion.73 The Court disagreed, stating that the governmental interest in

upholding the provision limiting contributions to multicandidate political committees was partly to prevent circumvention of the "very limitations on contributions that this Court upheld in Buckley."7 4 If

appellants' position was accepted, individuals and unincorporated associations could easily evade contribution limits pertaining to candidate elections and annual aggregate contributions.7 5
Since no
aggregate contribution limits are imposed on multicandidate commit-

tees, 76 individuals and groups could circumvent current contribution
restrictions if allowed to make unlimited contributions to multicandidate committees. The Court in CMA essentially said that the govern68. Id at 196.
69. Id at 195.
70. Id See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 39.
71. "Speech by proxy" was not a phrase used by the Court in Buckley; it originated with
the CMA opinion. It is nonetheless descriptive of the Buckley reasoning that money given to
a committee which later spends it or contributes it to a candidate or issue is not "direct
speech." Instead, it is speech "transformed" into political debate by one other than the
contributor. Compare CMA, 453 U.S. at 196 with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
72. 453 U.S. at 196.
73. Id at 197-98.
74. Id Buckley upheld all of the 1971 FECA contribution limitations as amended in
1974. 424 U.S. at 23-38. Individuals and unincorporated associations may contribute $1,000
to a candidate per calendar year, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), but are
limited to an annual aggregate of $25,000 in political contribution, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3).
Multicandidate committees may contribute $5,000 per year to a candidate, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441(a)(2)(A) and are not limited in the aggregate amount they may contribute annually, 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
75. 453 U.S. at 198.
76. Id
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mental interest was plugging a loophole through which contribution
limits might otherwise be evaded.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun was more direct in
identifying the governmental interest involved: "Multicandidate political committees are. . . essentially conduits for contributions to candidates, and as such they pose a perceived threat of actual or potential
corruption. ' ' 77 A different analysis, Blackmun stressed, would follow if
the issue was whether to limit contributions made to a political committee established for the sole purpose of making independent
expenditures.7 8
Justice Blackmun's apparent reluctance to acknowledge that independent expenditures may pose a danger of real or apparent corruption must be viewed in the light of his opinions before and after CMA.
In the context of his reasoning in Bellotti79 and Citizens Against Rent
Control v. Berkeley, 8°-in which he indicates his willingness to consider empirical evidence purporting to establish a causal link between
large expenditures and contributions in a ballot measure and actual or
apparent corruption of the democratic processes' '-Justice Blackmun
may be a more likely swing vote in favor of regulating independent
expenditures in a candidate campaign than his CMA concurring opinion would indicate.
C. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley
The Supreme Court followed the reasoning in Justice Blackmun's
CMA concurrence when it decided Citizens Against Rent Control
(CARC) v. Berkeley82 . The majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in CARC discussed the type of empirical data necessary to establish a causal relationship between large sums of money spent in a ballot
measure campaign and a resulting decline in voter confidence.
77. 453 U.S. at 203. Justice Blackmun concurred in parts I and II of the CMA judgment but he echoed the reservations he expressed in Buckley, supra note 47, in part III of the
opinion.
The Justice did not discuss committees that contribute to candidates and make independent expenditures. Nor was such a situation before the Supreme Court in Common
Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). See infra part III.
Justice Blackmun's refusal to limit contributions posing no threat of corruption was
consistent with his partial dissent in Buckley, in which he disagreed with the majority holding that contributions to candidates and candidate committees were entitled to less First
Amendment protection than expenditures. 424 U.S. at 290.
78. Id at 584.
79. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
80. 454 U.S. 290 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 82-115.
81. 435 U.S. at 789.
82. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).

Spring 1983]

SYMPOSIUM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

775

The voters of Berkeley, California adopted by initiative a munici-

pal ordinance placing a $250 limit on contributions to committees
formed to support or oppose ballot measures."' The appellant unincorporated association accepted contributions over $250 and was ordered

to pay the excess into the city treasury. 4 Citing Buckley, the California

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance,85 concluding that the law "furthered compelling governmental interests because it insured that special interest groups could not 'corrupt' the

initiative process" by spending large sums of money to support or op-

pose a ballot measure.8 6 The court found that corruption resulting

from the expenditure of large amounts to support or oppose a ballot
measure could produce apathetic voters. 87 The state high court then
upheld the ordinance, ruling that the governmental interest in electoral

participation outweighed any infringement on First Amendment
rights. 8I In reaching this conclusion, the California court also held that
the law accomplished its goals by the least restrictive means availablethe disclosure required by the ordinance provided insufficient protec-

tion against corruption.89

Chief Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion for the United
States Supreme Court, framed the issue as whether the limit on contributions to ballot measure committees violated the First Amendment. 90

The Court noted that "regulation of First Amendment rights is always
subject to exacting judicial review" 9 1 and reviewed the history of

Americans sharing common views "banding together to achieve a com-

mon end." 92 The Chief Justice stressed that the concept of freedom of
association guarantees people the right to be heard-particularly on
controversial issues-and reaffirmed the Court's rejection in Buckley of

83. "Section 602 is authorized by Elections Code section 22808 and provides: 'No person shall make, and no campaign treasurer shall solicit or accept, any contribution which
will cause the total amount contributed by one person with respect to a single election in
support of or in opposition to a measure to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars ($250)."'
27 Cal.3d at 822-23 n.l, 614 P.2d at 743 n.l, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 85 n.l.
84. Id at 822-23 n.l, 614 P.2d at 743 n.l, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 85 n.1.
85. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d-819, 832, 614 P.2d 742,
749, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84, 91 (1980).
86. Id The California Supreme Court also stated that "large contributions to a local
ballot measure campaign threaten our electoral system and potentially pervert the purpose
of initiative procedures." 27 Cal. 3d at 831, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Section 112 of the Berkeley ordinance required the City to publish in Berkeley
newspapers (considered appropriate by the Berkeley Fair Campaign Practices Commission),
a list of all contributors of over $50 to candidates or committees twice during the last week
of the campaign. Id at 826, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88.
90. 454 U.S. at 291.
91. Id at 294. See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; Belloul; 435 U.S. at 786.
92. 454 U.S. at 294.
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a governmental interest in "equalizing voices." 93 The plurality's emphasis on the rights of citizens to freely associate and to participate in
public discussion regardless of financial standing supported the first of
its two main criticisms of the Berkeley ordinance: under the ordinance
an affluent person acting alone could independently spend without
limit to express his or her views on a ballot measure, whereas contributions made in conjunction with other individuals exercising their freedom of association were restricted.9 4
The plurality's second criticism of the ordinance was based on the
exception discussed in Buckley to the rule prohibiting restrictions on
political activity. "[P]erception of undue influence of large contributors
to a candidate," Chief Justice Burger reminded the California court,
was the "single narrow exception" justifying contribution limits.95
Quoting with approval from its opinion in Bellotti, the plurality stated,
"'Referenda are held on issues, not candidates for public office. The
risk of [quidpro quo] corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.' "96 The judgment of the Court concluded that the integrity of the
political system would be protected adequately by public indentification of contributors and the amounts contributed. Since the Berkeley
ordinance already required disclosure, the plurality ruled that the city
of Berkeley's
asserted interest was insufficient and the means employed
97
too drastic.
In an aside apparently referring to the empirical data presented by
the appellees to support their claim of a governmental interest in the
supposed causal relationship between large sums of money "spent"98 in
a campaign and a decrease in voter confidence, the plurality stated that
"the record. . . does not support the California Supreme Court's conclusion that the ordinance is needed to preserve voters' confidence in
the ballot measure process."9 9 Thus, the emerging evidentiary burden
to be met by opponents of unlimited spending in the ballot measure
93. Id at 295-96. "'[ T ]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment ....

The First Amendment's protection against govermental

abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial
ability to engage in public discussion.'" Id (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
94. 454 U.S. at 296.
95. Id.
96. Id (quoting Bellott, 435 U.S. at 790).
97. 454 U.S. at 298-99.
98. The California ordinance limited the size ofcontributions to ballot measure committees, but the Supreme Court in CARC spoke in terms of money "spent," which presumably
also included expenditures by the ballot committees. See infra note 100.
99. 454 U.S. at 299. The California court cited a "commentator on that political scene,"
a political scientist, and a "student of the California initiative process." 27 Cal. 3d at 829,
614 P.2d at 747-48 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90. See also infra note 109.
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process was acknowledged by the four-member plurality. This burden
received fuller consideration by three of the four concurring Justices
and by the one dissenting Justice in CARC.
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment in CARC, but noted
that the plurality opinion failed to indicate "whether or not it attache[d] any constitutional significance to the fact that the Berkeley ordinance [sought] to limit contributions as opposed to direct
expenditures.'"' °" Citing Buckley and CMA, Marshall declared that the
Court had "always" distinguished between permissible restrictions on
contributions to political campaign committees, which as "speech by
proxy" are not entitled to full First Amendment protection, and impermissible limits on the amount of expenditures an individual chooses to
make to advance his or her own views.01 The Justice noted that the
plurality opinion did not specify which of the two tests it was applying
to the Berkeley contribution limit, and assumed the Court was applying
the "less rigorous" contribution standard. 0 Based on this assumption
Marshall was receptive to the argument that the Berkeley ordinance
was necessary to maintain voter confidence in government:
If I found that the record before the California Supreme Court
disclosed sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that large
contributions to ballot measure committees undermined the
"'confidence of the citizenry in government,'". . . I would join
Justice White in dissent on the ground that the State had demonstrated a sufficient governmental interest to sustain the indirect
infringment on First Amendment interests resulting from the operation of the Berkeley ordinance. Like Justice Blackmun and
O'Connor, however, I find no such evidentiary support in this

record.103
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor jointly concurred in the Court's
judgment in C4RC.'° Citing the Belotti standard, they agreed with
the plurality opinion that contribution limits must withstand "'exacting scrutiny' "to survive constitutional challenge.' 0 5 In order to meet
the standard, the Justices continued, the challenged ordinance must
100. Id at 301 (emphasis in original). The plurality stated that "Placing limits on contributions which in turn limit expenditures plainly impairs freedom of expression." Id at 299.
While the Berkeley ordinance sought to limit contributions, the four members of the CA4RC
plurality took the effect of the ordinance one step further and held that the ordinance "in
turn limited expenditures." (emphasis added). Justice Marshall was perplexed by the Court's
blurring of contributions and expenditures. Id at 301. The Court's logic is important in
determining whether independent expenditures in ballot measure processes and candidate
campaigns can be regulated.
101. Id at 301.
102. Id
103. Id at 301-02 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790).
104. 454 U.S. at 302.
105. Id (quoting Belloi, 435 U.S. at 786).
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meet two tests: 1) it must advance a sufficiently important governmental interest, and 2) be "closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgement
10 6
of First Amendment freedoms."
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor concluded that the Berkeley ordinance failed both tests.10 7 They agreed that the critical flaw in the
city's argument asserting its governmental interest was the lack of evi-

dentiary support. While recognizing Berkeley's interest in maintaining

voter confidence, 08 they found "sparse" evidence in the record to support that interest.10 9

Justice White, the sole dissenting Justice in CARC, found that the
evidence by record or legislative finding met the burden suggested in
Bellotti." 0 White argued that the Berkeley ordinance was tailored to
the requirements of both Buckley and Bellotfi in that it regulated contributions rather than expenditures, and did not restrict corporate
spending."' Taking judicial notice of several California ballot stud106. 454 U.S. at 302 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
107. 454 U.S. at 302.
108. "We would not deny the legitimacy of that interest." Id Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor emphasized that in Bellotti the Court had explicitly recognized "'interests of the
highest importance' in ballot measure elections," id (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89),
with which the Berkeley interest in maintaining voter confidence in government was clearly
compatible.
109. The two Justices explained that they "did not find those interests threatened in Bellotti
...in part because the State failed to show 'by record or legislative findings that
corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes' or 'the confidence of the citizenry in government.'" 454 U.S. at 303. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 78990). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor then stated flatly: "The city's evidentiary support in
this case is equally sparse." Id
Justice Richardson of the California Supreme Court was also critical of the appellees'
evidence. In his dissent in CARC . City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 835-36 614 P.2d 742,
751-53, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84, 93-95 (1980), Richardson assessed the data on which the California high court had relied on as "the opinions and views of the 'commentator,' 'political
scientist,' and 'student'. . . . Unquestioned and unverified, however, these opinions do not
constitute the hard evidentiary support needed to demonstrate a state's present and compelling interest in the suppression of the multiple First Amendment rights of our California
citizens. The existence of such a threat and its potential are wholly undocumented. Indeed
the only empirical data that appear in the record are studies of spending on statewide initiative campaigns in California during the period 1954-1974. The studies conducted by a Sacramento research organization, reveal that in 28 statewide contests the highest spenders won
14 times and lost 14 times. I must leave to the reader what that arithmetic proves." 27 Cal.
3d at 835-37, 614 P.2d at 751-753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93-95.
110. 454 U.S. at 303. White began his dissent with his long held conviction that the
Court had erred in Buckley and its progeny by not allowing regulation of expenditures. Id
He argued that the Court should have deferred to Congress, "the body most expert in the
matter," to restrict expenditures in campaigns for federal office. Id
111. Id at 305 n.1 Justice White noted that "[a]s originally passed by the voters the
Berkeley ordinance restricted expenditures as well as contributions to ballot measure campaigns." Berkeley repealed the ordinance expenditure restriction after the Court's decision
in Buckley. 454 U.S. at 304, n.l.
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ies, I Justice White stated, "Recognition that enormous contributions
from a few institutional sources can overshadow the efforts of individuals may have discouraged participation in ballot measure campaigns
'1 13 Aland undermined public confidence in the referendum process."
though White recognized that "Berkeley cannot present conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between major undisclosed expenditures
and the demise of the referendum as a tool of direct democracy,"1 14 he
felt that the Berkeley ordinance was justified by the rationale developed in Buckley and CMA4 upholding regulation of contributions.1 15
At this point, the Supreme Court was conscious of the use of empirical
evidence to establish a governmental interest sufficient to limit political
activity in ballot measure processes. One month after CARC, an
equally divided Court affirmed a district court judgment in a case involving allegations of corruption resulting from independent expenditures made on behalf of a candidate.
III.

The Evidentiary Record in Candidate Campaigns:

Common Cause v. Schmitt
In Common Cause v. Schmitt," 6 the Court was presented with a

constitutional challenge to a section of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act" 7 limiting independent expenditures made to advance
a publicly financed presidential candidate."' The validity of the limit
112. 454 U.S. at 307-08, nn.2-5.
113. Id at 308 (emphasis added).
114. Id at 309. White ended his dissenting opinion with a similar sentiment: "Perhaps,
as I have said, neither the City of Berkeley nor the State of California can 'prove' that
elections have been or can be unfairly won by special interest groups spending large sums of
money, but there is a widespread conviction in legislative halls, as well as among citizens,
that the danger is real. I regret that the Court continues to disregard that hazard." Id at
311.
115. Id at 309.
116. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), ajf'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 129
(1982) (Justice O'Connor did not participate).
117. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-213 (1976).
118. Section 9012(f) provided in pertinent part that "[it shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates
of a political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and
willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000."
The legislative history of § 9012(f) is somewhat unclear. There is no suggestion that
independent expenditures were intended to be limited under § 9012(f). During the 1971
floor debate on the Fund Act, its sponsor, Senator Pastore, was quizzed by Senator Goldwater about independent political activity. Pastore cited the FECA, not § 9012(f), as the
method by which to limit independent activity.
Senator Goldwater. "[Wlhat is there to stop me from supporting the candidate of my
choice, by forming a committee without his knowledge, without his having any way of
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was based on the Court's statements in Buckley approving expenditure
limits conditioned on the receipt of public funding."19
Common Cause, a public interest organization, and the Federal
Election Commission 120 brought actions against five groups of Ronald
Reagan supporters alleging that the groups had violated section 9012(f)
21
of the Fund Act by proposing to spend more than the $1,000 limit.'

The district court upheld the constitutionality of the limitation using
the analysis conceived in Buckley. 12 2 The court accurately stated that
election laws "regulating political expression require a demonstration
of 'compelling governmental interest' to withstand a constitutional
challenge calling for 'strict scrutiny' by the reviewing court."' 23 Prevention of corruption, the district court continued, justified a limit on
knowing about my committee, and, under my constitutional right of those associated with
me, to spend that money, to buy radio advertising-and use it-which he knows nothing
about, to spend it in any way I see fit? . . . Suppose [a candidate's] brother buys some time
on television and the candidate says, I did not know my brother was spending money that
way. There is no way we can prevent that."
Senator Pastore: "That is covered by S.382 [FECA]. I keep repeating that. What we
are trying to do is to characterize this particular bill [the Fund Act] as complimentary legislation on campaign expenditures and campaign financing. This is the financing part.... On
the proposition that the Senator is talking about, we took care ofthat three months ago when
wepassed [the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act]." 117 CONG. REc. 41953 (1972) (emphasis added).
The legislative history of the 1976 FECA Amendments, which included amendments to
the Fund Act, does not contain a single reference to § 9012(f). Senator Cannon, Chairman
of the Committee on Rules and Administration and floor manager of the 1976 Amendments
believed that expenditure limitations did not apply to supporters acting on behalf of a publicly financed presidential candidate. During the Senate Hearings on the 1976 FECA
Amendments, Senator Cannon stated, "Of course, under the Court's decision [in Buckley] if
we went to the public financing aspect, then we could get back to the limitation on expenditures, but it would go only to the candidate itself and still would not apply to the independent person or to the committee." Federal Election Comparison Act Amendments of 1976
Hearings on S. 2911 S.511 - Amendment No. 1396, S. 2912, S. 2918, S2953, S. 2980 and S.
2987 Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1976).
This legislative history was considered by the Court in Common Cause. See Brief for
Appellees Harrison Schmitt, et al., at 16-19, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
119. "[Alcceptance of public financing entails voluntary acceptance of an expenditure
ceiling. Non-eligible candidates are not subject to that limitation," 424 U.S. at 95.
120. Common Cause initially brought suit in the United States District Court, Common
Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1980), against Americans for Change, a political
action committee formed to raise and spend funds to support presidential candidate Ronald
Reagan. The Federal Election Commission filed a motion to intervene pursuant to 2
U.S.C.A. § 437c(b)(1), which states that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the
civil enforcement of FECA. For a discussion of the procedural background of the Common
Cause suit, see Claude & Kirchhoff, The "Free Market" of Ideas, 57 N.D. L. REv. 337
(1981).
121. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980).
122. Id at 493-96.
123. Id at 494.
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contributions but "[t]he right of citizens and groups to make expenditures in a campaign pose[d] . . . only the most attenuated danger of
quidpro quo.""' In a reference to the five defendant groups, the court
reasoned:
It is difficult. . . to imagine how the thousands of 'small voices'
associated together in a political committee could compromise a
candidate for President. . . .The candidate will be no more beto
holden to the political committees than Presidents typically are
25
those elements of their constitutency who voted for them.'
The court noted that the $5,000 annual contribution limitation was 2a6
further check on political committees' possible corruptive influence.'
The court then ruled that the Fund Act provision failed the strict scrutiny test since the governmental interest in fighting electoral corruption
was insufficiently compelling to justify a direct limitation on speech. 127
The district court thus held section 9012(f) to be unconstitutional without developing any factual record of Common Cause's theory that the
fact affiliated with Ronald Reagan and
defendant committees were12in
8
his authorized committees.
Underlying the Supreme Court's affirmance in Common Cause
may have been the lack of evidence showing corruption or establishing
a decline in citizen confidence in the democratic processes. In its brief
before the Supreme Court, Common Cause alleged that section 9012(f),
124. Id at 495.
125. Id at 498. The defendents in Common Cause were three committees and two individuals: Americans for Change raised $1,072,549 and independently spent $1,061,123 to
advance the candidacy of Ronald Reagan; Fund for a Conservative Majority raised
$3,163,528 and spent $3,150,496; and Americans for an Effective Presidency raised
$1,899,905 and spent $1,845,403. Federal Election Commission Public Records, "Committee Index of Disclosure Documents," as of Feb. 22, 1982. The two individual defendants
were the chairman and treasurer of Americans for Change, Harrison Schmitt and Carl
Curtis.
126. 512 F. Supp. at 498-99. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(C) limits to $5,000 the amount an
individual may contribute to a political committee.
127. Id at 501. The district court also relied on Republican Nat'l Comm. (RATC) v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 487 F. Sup. 289 (S.D.N.Y.), af'dsummariy, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) which
upheld public financing of presidential elections. The District of Columbia district court
stated that a decision by a Presidential candidate to accept public financing "cannot bind his
or her supporters outside the official campaign . . . 'most important.

. .

is that uncoordi-

nated expenditures are permitted without limits."' Common Cause, 512 F. Supp. at 495,
(citing RN'C, 487 F. Supp. at 286).
128. 512 F. Supp. at 500. Count II of the Common Cause complaint alleged that the
defendant committees were not independent of the Reagan campaign, and that "coordination and concerted action" existed between the committees and the Reagan general presidential campaign. Id at 501. The district court dismissed Count II on the ground that the
FEC was charged with exclusive jurisdiction over enforcing federal election laws, and because "[i]t would be... cumbersome for a three-judge court, ordered by Congress to expedite its consideration to supervise extensive discovery and receive detailed factual evidence."
Id
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as part of the statutory scheme providing public funding for presidential campaigns, served a compelling governmental interest in preserving the integrity of and public confidence in the presidency.12 9 Using
the Court's language in Buckley, the appellant argued, "It cannot be
gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper
influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest."' 130 Specifically, the effect of limiting expenditures
under section 9012(f) eliminated the real or apparent danger that publicly financed presidential candidates would be "[b]eholden to [p]rivate
[flundraisers."' 3 ' Asserting that the district court erred by missing the
"obvious influence acquired by the handful of fundraiser-managers
who run the political committees and control the aggregated funds,"' 3 2
Common Cause stated that "it is with these managers-and not the
33
contributors-that the real leverage (and thus the real danger) lies."'1
Common Cause reasoned that the fundraiser-manager can influence a
candidate-even though the committee is "independent"-by
"financ134
ing and running consciously parallel campaigns."
Specific evidence of the corrosive effect of private financial support, however, was contained in but one footnote in which Common
Cause claimed that "such 'preferred access' to the White House has
already been given to the fundraiser-managers of two 'independent'
political comittees."' 1 35 A newspaper article reference and the names of
two Republicans who communicated with the President after his election, however, is presumably not the "evidence" by legislative record or
finding that the Supreme Court discussed in Bellotti and CARC as sufficient to justify a restriction on political activities. In fact, Common
Cause omitted this argument in its subsequent reply brief and termed
the Reagan groups "unauthorized political committees."'' 36 Thus, it
may be that in Common Cause, as in Bellotti and CARC, the losing
party failed to present enough evidence of corruption or of a decline in
citizen confidence in the democratic process.
129. Brief for Appellants Common Cause, el al, at 23, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455
U.S. 129 (1982) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95).
130. Brief for Appellants, supra note 129, at 24 (quoting Buckle),, 424 U.S. at 96).
131. Id at 26.
132. Id at 29.
133. Id
134. Id at 27.
135. Id at 29-30, n.44. The fundraisers were Robert C. Heckman, Chairman of Fund
for a Conservative Majority, and John T. Dolan, Chairman of the National Conservative
Political Action Committee. Cited by Common Cause as support for this information was
the New York Times. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, at 24, col. 1.
136. Reply Brief for Appellants at 3, Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
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Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has indicated its awareness of
and willingness to receive empirical evidence designed to establish a

compelling state interest by which First Amendment rights legitimately
might be restrained. The state must show a "subordinating interest

which is compelling"' 3 7 and "employ means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment."' 38 Proponents of limits on independent expenditures and contributions in ballot measure campaigns have failed
in their use of empirical data: the evidence presented to the Supreme
Court in Bellotti and CARC was not strong enough to establish a causal
relationship between the amounts of money spent and a threat to voter
confidence in government. Four members of the Court, however, are
receptive to the "hard evidentiary support needed to demonstrate a
State's present and compelling interest" in restricting the use of money

in ballot measure campaigns.' 39

The fact that the Supreme Court has acknowledged a possible link

between large sums of money in a ballot measure campaign and a
threat to voter confidence suggests a similar openness to an attempt to
link large expenditures in a candidate campaign with declining voter
confidence. The appellants in Common Cause attempted to establish

such a link and failed, perhaps in part for lack of sufficient evidence.

Properly executed survey research" 4 is admissible at the discretion

137. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
138. Id.
139. The four Justices are Blackmun, O'Connor (see supra text accompanying notes 62,
104-09), Marshall (see supra text accompanying note 104) and White (seesupra text accompanying notes 111-16).
140. The use of a public opinion poll as evidence can be problematic. The alternatives
available to those polled and the categories in which responses are grouped can lead to wide
disparities in results. See Polls Can Be Tricky, PUBLIC OPINION 34 (Oct./Nov. 1979).
Civic Service, Inc., a political research organization, has conducted a series of polls over
the past four years to study the public's opinion on whether there should be public financing
of campaigns for congressional offices. Opposition to public financing increased over the
period of the four surveys, from a 63-32% opposition in 1977 to a 69-23% opposition in 1980.
Pfautch, Campaign Finance: The Signals from the Polls, PUBLIC OPINION, 52, 52-53
(Aug./Sept. 1980).
Two of the major polling firms indicate majority support for public finance. A Gallup
poll asked persons whether they approved of the federal government providing a fixed
amount of money for congressional campaigns if all private contributions from other
sources would be prohibited. In 1977 the public approved by a 57-32% majority and in 1979
by a 57-30% margin. Id A 1977 Harris poll inserted President Carter's endorsement into a
question similar to that asked by the Gallop organization. Harris respondents approved by
a 49-28% majority. Id
The president of Civic Service, Inc. stated that his four-year study does not impeach the
findings of Gallup or Harris: "[i]t
underscores a long held view in survey research that in
order to understand true public sentiment about a complex issue, one must pose questions to
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of the trial judge under the Federal Rules of Evidence.14 1 Survey research has been increasingly used in the past decade for a variety of
legal purposes.' 4 2 If opponents of independent expenditures-whether
in the context of a ballot measure or candidate campaign-can establish that the sample polled is adequate, the data gathering techniques
reliable and the conclusions drawn to be statistically significant, 14 3 survey research also may be used to effect a change in election finance law.
the public in a series of different ways to determine whether different phrases in a question
prompt different responses." Id
Consulting editor to Public Opinion magazine, Everett Carl Ladd, states the "reigning
myth" that "voter turnout is plunging to near-record lows ... as a product of the increased
alienation of Americans from their political system" is refuted when examined in historical
context:
Percent

Ladd, Opinion Roundup,

PUBLIC OPINION,

32 (Apr./May 1980).

141. FED. R. EVID. 703. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
670 (D.C.N.Y. 1963).
142. See Dutka, BringingPolls to Justice, PUBLIC OPINION, 47 (Oct./Nov. 1982).

143. Cf. Guardians Ass'n of the N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d
232, 240 (2d Cir. 1980).

